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Tax Arbitrage and the International Tax Regime
by Reuven 5. Avi-Yonah *
It is a great pleasure to introduce my student Luca Dell'Anese's book on tax arbitrage.
This is an important book on an important topic, which lies at the heart of the current
debate on whether an international tax regime exists in practice.
I have argued for many years (see, e.g., Avi-Yonah, 1996, 1997, 2000) that a coherent
international tax regime exists, embodied in both the tax treaty network and in
domestic laws, and that it forms a significant part of international law (both treatybased and customary). The practical implication is that countries are not free to adopt
any international tax rules they please, but rather operate in the context of the regime,
which changes in the same ways international law changes over time. Thus, unilateral
action is possible, but is also restricted, and countries are generally reluctant to take
unilateral actions that violate the basic norms that underlie the regime. Those norms
are the single tax principle (i.e., that income should be taxed once- not more and not
less) and the benefits principle (i.e., that active business income should be taxed
primarily at source, and passive investment income primarily at residence).
This thesis is quite controversial. Several prominent international tax academics and
practitioners in the US (e.g., Michael Graetz, David Rosenbloom, Julie Rain) and
elsewhere (e.g., Tsilly Dagan) have advocated the view that there is no international
tax regime and that countries are free to adopt any tax rules they believe further their
own interests (Graetz, 2001; Rosenbloom, 2000; Rain, 2002; Dagan, 2000). Other
prominent tax academics (e.g., Hugh Ault, Paul McDaniel, Richard Vann) and
practitioners (e.g., Phil West) have supported the view advocated above (Ault, 2002;
McDaniel, 2001; Vann, 2003; West, 1996).
The most important statement denying the existence of the international tax regime
was the 1998 Tillinghast Lecture delivered by H. David Rosenbloom at the NYU law
school (Rosenbloom, 2000). Rosenbloom began his lecture by quoting from the
legislative history of the US dual consolidated loss rules a statement referring to an
"international tax system." He then proceeded to deny the existence of this system or
regime ("that system appears to be imaginary"), because in the real world, only the
different tax laws of various countries exist, and those laws vary greatly from each
other.
* Irwin I. Cohn Professor of

Law and Director International Tax LL. M. Program, University of
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Of course, this description is true as far as it goes, but is this the whole truth? As
Rosenbloom noted in fact there has been a remarkable degree of convergence even
in the purely dome~tic tax laws of developed countries. Not only can tax lawyers talk
to each other across national boundaries and understand what each is saying (the
terminology is the same), but the need to face similar proble~s in. ta~g income has
led jurisdictions with different starting points to reach qutte similar results. For
example, countries that started off with global tax systems (i.e., tax "all income from
whatever source derived" in the same way) now have incorporated schedular elements
(for example, the capital loss and passive activity loss rules in the United States),
whereas countries with a schedular background (i.e., tax different types of income
differently) have largely adopted schedules for "other income" that lead to a global tax
base (for example, the U.K.).
Not surprisingly, this convergence is most advanced in international tax matters,
because in this case the tax laws of various jurisdictions actually interact with each
other, and one can document cases of direct influence. For example, every developed
country now tends to tax currently passive income earned by its residents overseas
(through controlled foreign corporations and foreign investmeent funds (FIF) rules,
which were inspired by the U.S. example), and to exempt or defer active business
income. Thus, the distinction between countries that assert worldwide taxing
jurisdiction and those that only tax territorially has lost much of its force. We will
develop many other examples of such convergence in the course of the book.
The claim that an international tax regime exists, however, rests mainly on the bilateral
tax treaty network, which, as Rosenbloom stated, is "a triumph of international law."
The treaties are of course remarkably similar (even to the order of the articles), being
based on the same OECD and UN models. 1n most countries, the treaties have a
higher status than domestic law, and thus constrain domestic tax jurisdiction; and even
in the United States, the treaties typically override contrary domestic law. This means
that in international tax matters, countries typically are bound by treaty to behave in
certain ways (for example, not tax a foreign seller who has no permanent
establishment), and cannot enact legislation to the contrary.
I would argue that the network of 2,000 or more bilateral tax treaties that are largely
similar in policy, and even in language, constitutes an international tax regime, which
has definable principles that underlie it and are common to the treaties. These
principles are the single tax principle and the benefits principle, which will be
articulated further below. In brief, the single tax principle states that income from
cross-border transactions should be subject to tax once (that is, not more but also not
less than once), at the rate determined by the benefits principle. The benefits principle
allocates the right to tax active business income primarily to the source jurisdiction
and the right to tax passive investment income primarily co the residence jurisdiction.
To those who doubt the existence of the international tax regime, let me pose the
following question: Suppose you were advising a developing country or transition
economy that wanted to adopt an income tax for the first time. How free do you think
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you would be to write the international tax rules for such a country in any way you
wanted, assuming that it wished to attract foreign investment? I would argue that the
freedom of most countries to adopt international tax rules is severely constrained,
even before entering into any tax treaties, by the need to adapt to generally accepted
principles of international taxation. Even if divergent rules have been adopted, the
process of integration into the world economy forces change. For example, Mexico
had to abandon its long tradition of applying formulas in transfer pricing and adopt
rules modeled after the OECD guidelines in order to be able to join the OECD.
South Korea similarly had to change its broad interpretation of what constitutes a
permanent establishment under pressure from the OECD. And Bolivia had to
abandon its attempt to adopt a cash flow corporate tax because it was ruled not
creditable in the United States. Even the United States is not immune to this type of
pressure to conform, as can be seen if one compares the 1993 proposed transfer
pricing regulations under IRC section 482, which led to an international uproar, with
the final regulations, which reflect the OECD guidelines.
Another illustration can be derived from recent developments in both the US and
Germany regarding the application of the principle of non-discrimination, which is
embodied in all the tax treaties, to thin capitalization rules that are designed to prevent
foreign taxpayers from eliminating the corporate tax base through capitalizing
domestic subsidiary corporations principally with debt. When the US first adopted its
thin capitalization rule in 1989, it carefully applied it both to foreigners and to
domestic tax exempts, so as not to appear to be denying interest deductions only to
foreigners. The US did this even though thin capitalization rules are an accepted part
of international tax law and even though its constitutional law permits unilateral
overrides of tax treaties. The Germans adopted the same rule, but when it was
nevertheless struck down as discriminatory by the European Court of Justice in 2002,
they responded by applying thin capitalization to all domestic as well as foreign
taxpayers. Neither the US nor the German actions are understandable in the absence
of an international tax regime embodying the principle of non-discrimination.
If an international tax regime exists, what does it look like? The following sections will
define the two basic principles which in my view underlie the international tax regime
and why they are normatively justified.

a. Defining the Tax Base: The Single Tax Principle
International income taxation involves two basic questions: 1. What is the appropriate
level of taxation that should be levied on income from cross-border transactions? 2.
How are the resulting revenues to be divided among taxing jurisdictions?
The answer to the first question is the Single Ta."< Principle: Income from cross-border
transactions should be subject to tax once (that is, neither more nor less than once).
The Single Tax Principle thus incorporates the traditional goal of avoiding double
taxation, which was the main motive for setting up the international tax regime in the
1920's and 1930's. Taxing cross-border income once also means, however, that it
should not be undertaxed or (at the extreme) be subject to no tax at all.
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The appropriate rate of tax for purposes of the Single Tax Prin~ipl~ is determined by
the second principle of international taxation, ~e Benefits ~nnc1pl~. Th~ Benefits
Principle, discussed below, assigns the primary aght to tax active busmess mcome to
source jurisdictions and the primary right to tax passive income to residence
jurisdictions. Therefore, the rate of ta.,x for purposes of the Single Tax Principle is
generally the source rate for active business income and the residence rate for passive
(investment) income. When the primary jurisdiction refrains from taxation, however,
residual taxation by other (residence or source) jurisdictions is possible, and may be
necessary to prevent undertaxation. Such residual taxation means that all income
from cross-border transactions, under the Single Tax Principle, should be taxed at
least at the source rate (which tends to be lower than the residence rate), but at no
more than the residence rate.
What is the normative basis for the Single Tax Principle? As an initial matter, I assume
that most countries would like to maintain both a personal income tax and a corporate
income tax. The reasons for having both a personal income tax and a corporate
income tax have been discussed extensively elsewhere, and are not repeated here (see,
e.g., Avi-Yonah 2002, 2004). For purposes of justifying the Single Tax Principle, it is
sufficient that most countries in fact maintain their existing personal and corporate
income taxes.
Given a preference for imposing both a personal and a corporate income tax on
domestically derived income of individuals and corporations, it becomes relatively
easy to establish why the Single Tax Principle is justified as a goal of the international
tax regime, on both theoretical and practical grounds. From a theoretical perspective,
if income derived from cross-border transactions is taxed more heavily than domestic
income, the added tax burden creates an inefficient incentive to invest domestically.
This proposition is widely accepted and underlies the effort, which by now is about a
century old, to prevent or alleviate international multiple taxation.
The corollary also holds true: if income from cross-border transactions is taxed less
heavily than domestic income, this creates an inefficient incentive to invest
internationally rather than at home. The deadweight loss from undertaxation is the
same as that from overtaxation.
In addition, there is also a strong equity argument against undertaxation of crossborder income, which applies to income earned by individuals. From an equity
perspective, undertaxation of cross-border income violates both horizontal and
vertical equity when compared to higher tax rates imposed on domestic source
income, and in particular on domestic labor income. In this case, the argument that
equity violations tend to turn into efficiency issues does not hold, because labor is less
mobile than capital and wage earners typically do not have the ability to transform
their domestic wages into foreign source income.
On a practical level, the Single Tax Principle can be justified because double taxation
leads to tax rates that can be extremely high and tend to stifle international
investment. Zero taxation, on the other hand, offers an opportunity to avoid domestic
taxation by investing abroad, and therefore threatens to erode the national tax base.
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T.S. Adams, the architect of the foreign tax credit and a major influence in shaping the
international tax regime, recognized both of these propositions in the 1920's. In
justifying the foreign tax credit, Adams wrote "the state which with a fine regard for
the rights of the taxpayer takes pains to relieve double taxation, may fairly take
measures to ensure that the person or property pays at least one tax." Contrary to an
exemption system, Adams' credit operated to eliminate double taxation by both
source and residence jurisdictions, but preserved residual residence-based jurisdiction
to enforce the Single Tax Principle (Graetz and O'Hear, 1997).
The practical justification for the Single Tax Principle can be seen most easily if one
imagines a world with only two countries, A and B, and only two companies, X (a
resident of A) and Y (a resident of B). If both A and B tax the foreign source income
of their residents and domestic source income of foreigners, and neither gives relief
from double taxation, then both X and Y would minimize their taxes by only deriving
domestic source income (since any foreign tax would by definition be an added
burden). The result would be adequate revenues collected by both A and B, but no
cross-border trade or investment.
On the other hand, suppose both A and B exempted from tax both foreign source
income and domestic source income of foreigners (a not inconceivable proposition in
many developing countries, which tax residents territorially and grant tax holidays to
foreign investors). In that case, the way for both X and Y to minimize their taxes
would be to derive their entire income from cross-border transactions. The result
would be adequate cross-border trade, but no revenues for A or B. In a world in
which international trade and investment are important, but taxes (unlike tariffs)
cannot be reduced to zero, the Single Tax Principle is the best option.

b. Dividing the Tax Base: The Benefits Principle
Having defined one goal of the international tax regime as taxing cross-border income
once, the next question is how to divide that base among the various jurisdictions
laying claim to it. The Benefits Principle states that the residence jurisdiction has the
primary right to tax passive (investment) income, while the source jurisdiction has the
primary right to tax active (business) income. As explained above, this division also
determines the appropriate rate of tax for purposes of the ingle Tax Principle.
This distinction, which stems from the work of the League of Nations in the 1920s,
also can be justified on both theoretical and pragmatic grounds. On a theoretical level,
the Benefits Principle makes sense because it is primarily individuals who earn
investment income, whereas it is primarily corporations that earn business income. In
the case of individuals, residence-based taxation makes sense. First, residence is
relatively easy to define in the case of individuals. Second, because most individuals
are part of only one society, distributive concerns can be addressed most effectively in
the country of residence. Third, residence overlaps with political allegiance, and in
democratic countries, residence taxation is a proxy for taxation with representation.
In the case of multinational corporations, source-based ta.xation seems generally
preferable. First, the grounds for taxing individuals on a residence basis do not apply
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to corporations. The residence of corporations is difficult to esta~li_sh and rel~tively
meaningless. Residence based on place of incorporation 1s formalistic and subiect to
the control of the taxpayer, while residence based on management and control also
can be manipulated. Moreover, multinationals are not part of a single society and their
income does not belong to any particular society for distributive purposes. Finally,
multinationals can exert significant political influence in jurisdictions other than the
residence jurisdiction of their parent company, and therefore the concern about taxing
foreigners who lack the ability to vote is less applicable to them.
Second, source-based taxation is consistent with a benefits perspective on justifying
tax jurisdiction. Source jurisdictions provide significant benefits to corporations that
carry on business activities within them. Such benefits include the provision of
infrastructure or education, as well as more specific government policies such as
keeping the exchange rate stable or interest rates low. These benefits justify sourcebased corporate taxation in the sense that the host country's government bears some
of the costs of providing the benefits that are necessary for earning the income. As
T.S. Adams wrote in 1917, "A large part of the cost of government is traceable to the
necessity of maintaining a suitable business environment." These costs justify
imposing a tax as compensation to the government bearing them.
On a more pragmatic level, as Adams also observed, since the source jurisdiction has
by definition the "first bite at the apple," that is, it has the first opportunity to collect
the tax on payments derived from within its borders, it would be extremely difficult to
prevent source jurisdictions from imposing the tax. "Every state insists upon taxing
the non-resident alien who derives income from source [sic] within that country, and
rightly so, at least inevitably so." Thus, as Michael Graetz and Michael O'Hear
observe, even if economists tend to prefer pure residence-based taxation, this
recommendation is unlikely to be followed in practice (Graetz and O'Hear, 1997).
This is particularly the case for business income derived from large markets, in which
case there is little fear that the foreign investor will abandon the market because of
source-based taxation. For portfolio investment, however, even large source countries
like the United States have tended to abandon it for fear of driving away mobile
capital. Thus, business income is a better candidate for source-based taxation than
investment income.
The division between active (mostly corporate) and passive (mostly individual) income
also makes sense because it is congruent with the Single Tax Principle, since most of
the rate divergence among taxing jurisdictions arises in the individual income tax,
while corporate tax rates have tended to converge. The top marginal personal income
tax rate among OECD member countries varied in 2003 from 11.5% (Switzerland) to
62.7% (Denmark). This variability is acceptable for purposes of the Single Tax
Principle, because under the Benefits Principle most income earned by individuals in
cross-border transactions is investment income that generally is subject only to
residence country tax. Therefore, the residence country rate typically determines the
smgle tax rate for investment income.
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Corporate tax rates, on the other hand, do not vary so widely (and also tend to be flat,
rather than progressive). Among OECD member countries, in 2003 the corporate tax
rate ranged from 12.5% (Ireland) to 52.2% (Italy), but 23 out of 29 member countries
had rates in the 29% to 40% range. Thus, for purposes of the Single Tax Principle,
the rate applied is generally the residence rate for individual (mostly investment)
income and a rate in the 30-40% range for corporate (mostly business) income. It is
congruent with both the Single Tax and Benefits Principles, however, to have residual
taxation by residence or source jurisdictions in cases where the jurisdiction that has
the primary right to tax under the Benefits Principle refrains from doing so. Thus,
under the Single Tax and Benefits Principles, all income from cross-border taxation
under current rate structures should be taxed at a rate between approximately 30%
(the lower end of the source rates) and approximately 60% (the higher end of the
residence rates).
Neither the Single Tax Principle nor the Benefits Principle provides a clear answer to
the question of how to divide the corporate income tax base among the various
jurisdictions providing benefits. Market prices can provide an answer when
transactions are at arm's length, but not when they are between related parties (and
there are no comparable arm's length transactions). In addition, the Single Tax
Principle requires that taxation be imposed even on income derived from a
jurisdiction that chooses not to levy a tax in return for the benefits it provides. These
issues will be addressed further below.
It is useful to summarize the resulting structure of international taxation in the
following table, which divides the world into two categories of taxpayers, resident and
non-resident. For each category, there is a further division between active (business)
and passive (investment) income. Active income is taxed primarily at source, while
passive income is taxed primarily at residence:
Table 1: The Structure of the International Tax Regime

WORLD
Residents
Active
Passive
Low tax
High tax

Non-residents
Active
Passive
High Tax
Low ta.x

As noted by Rosenbloom (2000), tax arbitrage forms the most crucial test for the
existence of an international tax regime. As Luca Dell' Anese explains, ta,'{ arbitrage
uses the differences between countries' tax law to violate the single tax principle, and
thus attitudes toward it depend crucially on the view one takes of the international tax
regime. The following book shows that in fact most countries do not tolerate ta,'{
arbitrage and try to combat it. Thus, it is a very important contribution to the
international tax literature, and should be studied carefully by anyone who cares about
this subject.
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